













This article revisits Hayden White’s claims about historical representation and interpretation as they apply to the historiography of the Holocaust. It engages with the recent work of three theorists of history, all of whom are to a greater or lesser extent indebted to White: Kalle Pihlainen, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, and Paul A. Roth. In particular, I examine Kuukkanen’s ‘post-narrativist philosophy of historiography’, which regards history as constructed – there is no truth in terms of correspondence – but at the same time as a rational enterprise, thus disallowing interpretations that do not conform to established and shared disciplinary rules. Kuukkanen looks to the historiography of World War I for his examples, while here I turn to the Holocaust as a powerful test case for theory of history. The article concludes that ‘rational constructivism’ leaves the problem of adjudicating between competing narratives which meet the criteria to be considered as ‘rationally constructed’ unanswered and argues that this state of affairs – which means the permanent impossibility of closure – should be approved of rather than worried about. 
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‘Our knowledge of the past may increase incrementally, but our understanding of it does not.’ Hayden White (1978, 89)

Introduction
‘History is a cruel goddess, ruthless, and documents again and again her ice-cold neutrality, her indifference. Only if one is forward-looking and future-oriented, and educates young people towards a noble spirit and behaviour, can one excommunicate the past’ (Lebrecht 1960, 1). The author of these words was not a professional historian but a Holocaust survivor who in 1960 gave his testimony to the Wiener Library in London as part of its programme to collect written reports by survivors.​[1]​
Why should one want to excommunicate the past? This religious term suggests that the pattern of human behaviour in the past is equivalent to the commission of some sort of heresy, and that a break needs to be made to separate out human beings now – perhaps in order to secure them a meaningful future – from the evil of the past, ‘evil’ being a term to which we readily resort without considering its implications for the ‘ordinariness’ of human destructiveness. It suggests that we need to break with the past, to make it outcast. This would reflect the historian’s sense that the Holocaust cannot be dealt with like other past events; as Frank Ankersmit asks, ‘Is there an already known reality to which we can reduce or in terms of which we can clarify the Holocaust? Is there an already well known and well established pattern of human behaviour from which we can derive the Holocaust? Obviously not’ (2001, 177).​[2]​ Or, as Dan Diner writes, ‘The integration of the Holocaust into the course of history, the construction of an appropriate historical narration for an event unprecedented in its brevity and extremity, somehow disconnected from past and future, still remains an insurmountable task. It seems that the only serious attempt to deal with it historiographically is to accept its fundamental irreconcilability with the saeculum’s core narratives’ (2003, 78). The problem, however, is that the Holocaust has been, and continues to be, endlessly written about. Perhaps the very act of writing (and reading) is an attempt to distance oneself from that terrible past? But, the question remains, which past? What is it that we are trying to comprehend and to keep at bay? Does the ‘right’ version of the past allow us to ‘excommunicate’ some aspect of human behaviour? The problem is knowing which is the right narrative. If the Holocaust is somehow unamenable to familiar historiographical narratives, then which version of the past are we supposed to accept?
Hayden White famously wrote that ‘when it comes to apprehending the historical record, there are no grounds to be found in the historical record itself for preferring one way of construing its meaning over another’ (1987, 75).​[3]​ He could have added: but we nevertheless need the historical record in order to think about the past at all. Elsewhere he has written that ‘Historians constitute their subjects as possible objects of narrative representation by the very language they use to describe them’ (1978, 95). Those who have indicted White for being anti-historical or ‘relativist’ might have been less forthright had White clarified in more detail that when historians constitute their subjects they do so on the basis of the evidence of the past that has come down to the present and on which historians necessarily rely, that is, that the historical text is constructed, but not out of nothing. Of course, it is also the case that the historical record – i.e. the traces of the past that remain in the present – is itself not fixed but needs to be subjected to source criticism and interpreted. Nevertheless, as Paul A. Roth notes, ventriloquizing the work of Leon Goldstein, the constitution of history through historical research not only means that ‘An eventful historical past exists only as a result of human theorizing’ but that ‘History becomes an artefact of a disciplined disciplinary imagination’ (2012, 319). In other words, history as a variety of poesis is not in contradiction with a rigorous reliance on the available evidence, which must be selected, interpreted, and written about in ways that are familiar to all historians (e.g. Rüsen 2005; Stone 2012). There is no ‘past itself’ against which to check an interpretation; we can only talk about the past insofar as it has come down to us through evidence, which might include texts, material artefacts, and eyewitness testimony, as well as memory. As Roth says, ‘We make, unmake and remake the past not out of ignorance, but because at the level of human actions the past just consists of such makings and remakings’ (2002, 134).

In this article I will revisit White’s claims about historical representation and interpretation as they apply to the historiography of the Holocaust. I will do so by engaging with the recent work of three theorists of history, all of whom are to a greater or lesser extent indebted to White. Kalle Pihlainen has produced a large number of essays on historical representation and narrative in which, from a starting point that accepts White’s claims about the constructedness of history, he develops an argument about the continued uses and relevance of history that presents its ‘truth’ the more surely it reveals its authorial construction. I also examine the arguments of another Finnish philosopher of history, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, who puts forward what he calls a ‘post-narrativist philosophy of historiography.’ In this view, history is seen as constructed – there is no truth in terms of correspondence – but is at the same time regarded as a rational enterprise, thus disallowing interpretations that do not conform to established and shared disciplinary rules. Rather than seeing narrative as the primary locus of historical explanation, Kuukkanen stresses the ‘informal argument’ as the ‘central synthesising notion’ (2015a, 227). Importantly for this article, Kuukkanen also insists that the lack of concrete examples in debates in theory of history leaves the latter weak (2015b, 154). He looks to the historiography of World War I for his examples, while here I turn to the Holocaust because the size and variety of the historiography and the continuing ethical and political ramifications of the Holocaust mean that it provides a powerful test case for theory of history.​[4]​
Finally, I also engage with the recent work of Paul A. Roth, who in several important articles has also put forward an understanding of history as constructed but who, through his theory of irrealism and explanation, sets out a position not dissimilar from Kuukkanen’s in that it posits the process of classification as more important than that of perception for constructing history but also emphasises the shared rules by which the classification procedure operates.​[5]​ As an aside in one of his articles, Roth notes that the Holocaust is often appealed to as the ‘favourite bogeyman’ of those who believe that not subscribing to a realist understanding of history is a moral failing; here I will pick up on this problem of the Holocaust as a sort of bellwether for historical theorising and will argue that the huge historiography of the Holocaust is in fact, contrary to a realist position, the best illustration of the validity of the currently-prevailing theory of ‘rational constructivism’ in the theory of history. But I will also point to the limits of that approach, arguing that its search for a means to adjudicate between competing narratives misses the point that there is no possibility of closure in historical writing and that this impossibility of closure is a positive state of affairs.

Rational constructivism
With the exception of some who have recently promoted the notion of presence – a kind of throwback to romanticism signalling a dissatisfaction with the rationalism which says that the past is inaccessible – with its implications that historians can somehow touch the ‘real’ past, most theorists of history and most historians accept that history is unavoidably constructivist.​[6]​ There are very few realists around anymore who believe that the historian simply discovers what happened in the past and then produces texts which mirror past occurrences in a pure mimesis. White’s claim that there is nothing in the historical record itself which tells us what the past means or which narrative explanation should prevail seems to have become widely accepted. And so it should, for it is not a claim that, as detractors argue, is tantamount to anti-realism, for it is not a claim about the existence of the past. It is a claim that accepts that things happened in the past but says that when history is written the past is then constructed in the present, not ‘recreated’ wie es eigentlich gewesen (Pihlainen 2014b, 14). The historian is not a conduit but someone who shapes what the past looks like in the present. Carolyn Steedman writes of working in archives that ‘The object (the event, the happening, the story from the past) has been altered by the very search for it, by its time and duration: what has actually been lost can never be found’ (2001, 77). So it is that the historical narrative is not synonymous with the past; rather, the past is altered by the very description of it, and thus by every description of it. Importantly, though, White’s claim about the historical record does not, as some have suggested, mean that history and fiction are indistinguishable (Pihlainen 2002, 39-60); the very use of the term ‘historical record’ suggests a body of sources on which historians have to rely to construct their narratives. History, as Alun Munslow explains, is a fictive construction of the past; that does not mean it is made up in the sense of being invented, but it is made up in the sense of being ‘put together’ by the historian (2012: 8-10). Nor – and here is perhaps the most contested point – does it mean that there are no grounds for choosing one interpretation over another (Pihlainen 2015b, 151). This is something to which I will return below.
The problem under investigation is thus not how history derives meaning from the past but an ethical question of how historians’ narratives shape/construct the past. Since, as Roth notes, ‘no formal criterion for narrative structure stands as an analogue to derivability in formal models of scientific explanation’ (2008, 220), it is the problem of construction itself, the historian’s sources, literary choices, overall interpretation and, crucially, disciplinary dialogue that come into play. ‘Accounting for connectivity’, as Roth puts it, remains at stake (2008, 220).
In other words, if meanings of the past in historical narratives are independent of past reality (or are not mimetic reproductions of it) and cannot be checked against past reality, then the question becomes one of legitimising and adjudicating between interpretations. How can this be done? First, by taking part in a debate with other historians; as Kuukkanen says, ‘each historical text can be seen as an argumentative intervention in the discursive field of historiography’ (2015b, 164). History is not written in a vacuum, nor do historians simply go to the archive and then write up what they find there. ‘The plausibility of a historical thesis’, writes Kuukkanen, ‘depends on its impact within the argumentative field’ (2015b, 165). Furthermore, those historiographical dialogues and debates take place in ‘a specific setting molded by various kinds of social and political interests’ (2015b, 165). These are not random but, although constantly changing, provide the grounds for shared practices and procedures that define the historical discipline. This in turn means, according to Kuukkanen, that ‘Historiographical discourse takes place in a politicised context, but on rational grounds’ (2015b, 166). Kuukkanen’s focus on the historians’ dialogue means that he shifts our attention away from narrativity as the defining characteristic of historiography, putting in its place reasoning and argumentation (2015b, 172). So, although there is no correspondence theory of truth, since historiography is governed by rationality, we can continue to have confidence in historians’ arguments (2015b, 192, 197-198).​[7]​
Kuukkanen’s position is attractive in that it legitimises historical practice without resorting to realist arguments about being able to check the historian’s account against the past. Nevertheless, even if we accept the basic premise of ‘rational constructivism’ – and I think we should – in Kuukkanen’s account it remains unclear how to choose between one account and another. Arguing that a historical text should be evaluated for its appropriateness rather than its truth-function, Kuukkanen offers three grounds for considering a historical text ‘appropriate’: epistemic, rhetorical and discursive. A historian’s text is appropriate insofar as it forwards an argument that effects or seeks to effect a change in historians’ ‘argumentative context’ (2015a, 232)​[8]​; history is first and foremost a dialogue between historians. 
The claim that history is above all a dialogue between historians who feel themselves bound by disciplinary rules is an attractive one (especially to professional historians) but it does not do away with the problem of adjudicating between interpretations. Certainly historians’ individual truth claims can be verified by reference to the sources. ‘None of the constructivist “corrections” to the usual history-related misunderstandings’, writes Pihlainen, ‘makes the claim that historical accounts could not still be falsified on the basis of facts’ (2013a, 44). But the sources are only partial traces of the past and there is another truth – ‘meaning’ – that is not synonymous with individual statements. How can a story or a narrative be true? As Pihlainen says, following White, ‘historical writing (or any other referential and ‘truthful’ narration, for that matter) cannot be produced without ideological valuation and assessment of the significance of the facts presented, or, indeed then, without the introduction of added meanings belonging to the representational (literary) form’ (2013b, 510). So it is not the case, as Kuukkanen claims, that narrativism identifies the narrative representation as a whole with the individual statements of which it is composed; nor is it the case that in narrativism those individual statements cannot be assessed for their truth value (e.g. Napoleon was born in Corsica) (2015a, 232-233). Rather than placing them in competition – though sharing a rejection of the realist position – we need to bring the insights of narrativism, with its focus on the text, and rational constructivism, with its focus on the argument and the discursive context, together.
The discovery of new facts might invalidate an old interpretation (or render it partial) but will never lead to the existence of only one ‘correct’ interpretation. Even if we had ‘all the facts’ (a nonsense claim), a multiplicity of narratives would still flow therefrom. As Pihlainen says, ‘interpretations (like stories) are not something that can be found in the details of the past, hence the concept of truth does not apply to them as it does to factual information in the form of singular factual statements, and hence, since reality and representations are in this way of a radically different order, historical facts can never be sufficient for controlling the narrative and formal aspects of representing’ (2013b, 511-512). Or as White says: ‘The best counter to a narrative that is supposed to have misused historical memory is a better narrative, by which I mean a narrative, not with more historical facts, but a narrative with greater artistic integrity and poetic force of meaning’ (2005, 336). This is compatible with ‘getting the facts straight’ but there is nevertheless no simple derivability of meaning from facts (Pihlainen 2013a, 44).​[9]​ Here I see the possibility of bringing Kuukkanen’s position in line with Pihlainen’s, for both reject a realist view and, although their emphases lie in different places (rational argument versus narrative interpretation respectively), they agree that individual statements can be true (in the sense of being empirically confirmable with reference to sources) and that an interpretation cannot be true but only rationally warranted or appropriate.
The implication of Kuukkanen’s and Pihlainen’s arguments is that we need to pay attention to historical construction. We need to consider the historical text not just as an epistemological problem of how we know the past and whether the historians’ narratives are truthful or authentic but also as an ontological object, itself a historical trace and a marker of how the past is understood in the present. Pihlainen says that ‘epistemological criteria are simply not applicable to narratives’ (2013b, 512). By this I take him to mean that that we cannot know the meaning of the past on the basis of the traces of the past that we have to hand (sources). That doesn’t invalidate source critique but suggests that source critique does not exhaust our understanding of the past’s (pasts’?) possible meanings.

How then is meaning (understand as synonymous with values) generated? Kuukkanen argues as follows:

The availability of rational standards of evaluation explains why any fears that ‘anything goes’ are baseless. A historian’s construct can be seen as epistemically authoritative if it is seen to be fit with respect to all dimensions of cognitive justification: the rhetorical, the epistemic and the discursive. That is, the text is a persuasive manifestation of reasoning for a thesis; it is an exemplary employment of epistemic values, including references to actual historical objects with regard to non-colligatory expressions; and it is a successful argumentative intervention in the relevant argumentative context. In this kind of case, a historiographical text has a rational warrant that gives it the epistemic authority for what is stated. Further, any text is an argumentative speech act and, in the ideal case, readers feel rationally compelled to accept the reasoning of the historian and the historian’s conclusion. (2015b, 199)

In Kuukkanen’s account, meaning does not appear magically on the basis of the textual (formal) arrangement provided by the historian but is thought out in advance as the historian evaluates sources and arranges them into a text whose explanatory force is based not solely on aesthetic grounds but on a shared disciplinary framework and a dialogue with existing interpretations. Thus, although there are no grounds for pursuing a ‘truth-functional evaluation of interpretations in historiography’ (Kuukkanen), there are disciplinary rules and procedures which make such evaluation meaningful and compelling.
A further implication of this argument is that historiography (the history of history-writing) historicises what Paul Ricoeur calls the ‘historical operation.’ Even if historians for the most part choose not to engage with constructivist theory qua theory – Pihlainen claims that ‘constructivist theory has very little hold on actual historical research’ (2013b, 552) – that theory still provides a good description of how the ‘historical operation’ actually works. That is to say, what historians write – irrespective of what they think they are doing – might well be understood as constructivist, but rationally so, on the basis of sources whose individual verifiability can be ascertained – i.e. by reference to those same sources, which is not the same thing as proving what happened when, but merely proving that something is in the sources. For example, what Goebbels wrote in his diary about the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of April 1943 can be shown to be in the diary, but it might be risky to take his word for what actually happened. Or, for a more complex case, how twentieth-century states chose to portray themselves through the mass media (radio, for example), might be regarded by historians as fascinating source material but would hardly be regarded on its own either as proof of what happened or as an explanation for what happened.​[10]​
This non-entailment from fact to value, or from source to interpretation, since it is not simply a theoretical assertion but a description of the historical operation, i.e. what historians actually already do, means that, as Roth notes, ‘tolerating a pluralism of worlds does not sanction sacrificing rigour’ (2002, 125). Disregarding a realist view in favour of a rational constructivist one does not mean historians have to change what they already do, only that they accept that what they do is itself historicisable and – no matter how deeply indebted to disciplinary practice – that their texts constitute but one possible interpretation among an infinite number.
In other words, the past is not only not accessible as the past itself (indeed, the notion of ‘the past itself’ is logically incoherent) but it is not fixed. This is so not only because we only have some traces of the past – albeit for modern historians, more than any one historian can master – and these are themselves not transparent windows on to the intentions and actions of past actors; the past is also not fixed because, as Ian Hacking and others have observed, our understanding of the past often involves perceptions that were not available to actors at the point in time which we analyse in the present: ‘Events in a life can now be seen as events of a new kind, a kind that may not have been conceptualised when the event was experienced or the act performed. What we experienced becomes recollected anew, and thought in terms that could not have been thought at the time’ (Hacking 1999, 130, cited in Roth 2002, 126). The classic example of this claim is the historian’s assertion that the Thirty Years War began in 1618; no one in 1618 could have made that statement (Danto 1962, 155). There are many examples of this phenomenon in Holocaust historiography, often associated with different ‘turns’ in the humanities. The ‘spatial turn’, for example, is currently a fruitful way of bringing concepts from cultural geography to bear on the pancontinental history of the Holocaust. But when Tim Cole, for example, suggests that the way Holocaust victims acted indicates their ‘spatial strategies’ he is not suggesting that actors in the past thought to themselves at such moments of desperation that their best hopes of survival would be to undertake such a ‘spatial strategy’ (2016, 7).
The history of the Holocaust contains many such examples, as do all bodies of historiography. Like ‘Cold War’ or ‘Industrial Revolution’, ‘Holocaust’ is a colligatory expression, a term which brings together things that happened in a way that renders them logical or coherent (ignoring for the moment the argument that the Holocaust was fundamentally incoherent or illogical). The very term ‘Holocaust’ is not a reflection of thing that can be found in the past but is a term that is given to a huge set of events in order to bring them under cognition. Debate thus ensues first of all about which events to include within the term: the murder only of the Jews by the Nazis or the murder of Roma and Sinti, Soviet POWs and others? The Nazi ghettos and camps or also the experience of Polish Jews who spent the war in the Soviet Union? The Nazi perpetrators or the actions of their allies too, some of whom acted quite independently of control from Berlin? Debate rages too over how the unfolding of ‘the event’ is to be conceptualised. The question of how, as Roth would say, connection occurs, is evidence of different and competing historiographical strategies.

Holocaust historiography
In the remainder of this article I offer some examples from the vast body of Holocaust history, concurring with Kuukkanen that specific examples of historical texts provide a stronger sense of what the theorists of history are arguing about. I will not use the by-now canonical example of Christopher Browning (1992) and Daniel Goldhagen (1996) on Order Police Battalion 101, for their competing concepts of ‘ordinary men’ and ‘ordinary Germans’ have become familiar.​[11]​ Instead, I turn to several other key debates amongst historians.
Browning is a key participant in another debate in Holocaust historiography, that concerning the timing of the decision-making process for the ‘Final Solution’. In a series of major works, the small number of historians who have knowledge of the relevant sources have set out plausible but different narratives of this process, the significance of which stems from the ‘intentionalist-functionalist debate’ but goes beyond it to more recent concerns such as the Holocaust as ‘colonial genocide’ or as ideologically-driven fixation. On the basis of many shared documents, but with some that feature more prominently in some accounts than in others, historians such as Peter Longerich, Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, Laurent Brayard, Christian Gerlach and others have proposed narrative explanations for the timing of the ‘decision-making process for the Final Solution’. Some of these accounts are canonical and, despite different emphases, share common ground. This is the case especially with Longerich and Browning, whose accounts place greater stress on certain moments in time (September-October 1941 for Browning; spring 1942 for Longerich) but which can profitably be read in conjunction with each other. Others are what we might call historiographical outliers; Gerlach, for example, insists on the significance of the US entry into the war in December 1941 as the crucial turning point for the Nazis, and Brayard urges his readers to see the ‘final solution’ as a plot enacted by Himmler to the extent that even other leading Nazis were unaware of it in autumn 1941 (Brayard 2012) – a position which gave rise to heated debate. Saul Friedländer’s ‘integrated history of the Holocaust’ attempts to shift the perspective of the historians who focus on the perpetrators by insisting that the Nazis’ actions need to be placed in a more rounded narrative that also includes the victims, who are therefore shown not be the agency-less figures they appear as in perpetrator-focused historiography, and other actors, such as the churches, the neutral states, or the Jewish communities in the ‘free world’. He still has to deal with the question of the timing for the ‘final solution’, however; it is perhaps a mark of his focus on an ‘integrated history’ that his discussion of timing is distinctly abbreviated and that Friedländer offers only an estimate of when ‘the’ decision was taken, suggesting by implication that the question is not all that significant anyway.
The question of the timing of the ‘final solution’ has indeed received less attention of late, as Holocaust historians have turned their attention to what is currently an even more heated debate. It is contentious because it has to some extent revived an earlier debate about the putative ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust, not in comparison to Stalinist terror, as in the West German Historikerstreit (historians’ debate) of the 1980s but in the context of world history with its seemingly endless stories of slavery, genocide and colonial atrocity. In a recent synthetic account, Donald Bloxham, a historian of Nazi war crimes trials and of the Armenian genocide, made the argument that the Holocaust should be regarded as a case of genocide. Not especially provocative, one might think, but some historians regard any attempt to contextualise the murder of the Jews into European or world history as undermining what is specific about the Holocaust – whereas Bloxham and his supporters would argue that not doing so leaves the Holocaust in a sacred space where it can hardly be understood as part of human history at all. 
The response to Bloxham’s book by critics such as Dan Michman or Omer Bartov suggests in fact that for some historians attempting to contextualise the Holocaust beyond German history in the years 1933-1945 is, in Kuukkanen’s phrase, inappropriate. The same might be said for another book, Alon Confino’s A World without Jews, which has had a similar effect but with an argument that is more or less the opposite to Bloxham’s. Confino stresses the Nazi imagination, showing how the Nazis built on long-term German collective memory to facilitate an attack on the Jews that began symbolically – burning the Hebrew Bible – and ended physically in genocide. This is in some ways an ultra-intentionalist argument, in the sense that the focus is squarely on the creation of a Nazified public sphere dominated by antisemitism; Confino has little to say about the war or about the circumstances in which the Nazis found themselves in from 1939 onwards which might justify a more ‘functionalist’ or ‘world historical’ reading of the unfolding of Judenpolitik. When it comes to the criticisms of both books, the point is not that Confino’s and Bloxham’s arguments are not true but that historians in certain situations find the argumentation inappropriate. In Kuukkanen’s terms, Confino’s and Bloxham’s book are not untrue in the sense of correspondence but lack an appropriate rational warrant or argumentative context. The problem is: if one happens to disagree with these criticisms then how does one choose between them? Kuukkanen is too hasty in dismissing the narrativists’ insistence on aesthetic and moral criteria. For it might well be a good description of historiography to say that it is constructed, to say that interpretation is a form of informal, rational argument, and to say that we choose the ‘best’ histories on the basis of their argumentative warrant, but that still does not satisfy the problem of choosing between competing interpretations in a crowded, politically sensitive and emotionally-charged field such as the historiography of the Holocaust. Here the ‘overall interpretation’ is indeed of significance. What is colligated under the term ‘Holocaust’ for Bloxham and Confino, say, might be different from that colligated under that term by Michman or Bartov (see Moses 2016).
The debate over how to contextualise the Holocaust, especially in its relationship to colonialism and the history of genocide, might suggest that older ways of thinking have disappeared. In fact, what used to be discussed as the debate between ‘functionalists’ (or ‘structuralists’) and ‘intentionalists’ has recently resurfaced. The latter argued that the Holocaust developed in unpredictable stages, in response to the changing fortunes of the war and the interaction between competing Nazi and German state agencies; the former claimed that the Holocaust was the logical and predictable result of Hitler’s intentions, stated early on in his career, to eliminate the Jews (see Sone 2010, ch2). The late David Cesarani, in his posthumously-published major synthesis, Final Solution (2016), surprised his colleagues by arguing, seemingly contrary to his previously-held views, that the Holocaust was disorganised and chaotic and unfolded on a reactive, ad hoc basis determined more by the circumstances of the war than by Nazi ideology. The argument is not new but it appears to have persuaded more people in Cesarani’s incarnation than in those put forward by, say, Arno J. Mayer (1988) or Gerhard L. Weinberg (1998).​[12]​ This is so not because it is more ‘true’ in the sense of correspondence; not even because it is more appropriate in the sense of having a stronger argumentative context; but because, among other reasons, it has the backing of well-known senior historians (such as Richard Overy or Nikolaus Wachsmann) and in the context of Holocaust historiography in 2016 the argument seems much more attractive, in light of several decades’ worth of work demonstrating to the satisfaction of all but the most intractable of functionalists that the Third Reich was riddled with antisemitism and that whatever the precise mechanism by which this antisemitism came to shape policy, its presence cannot be denied.​[13]​ Where some critics thought that Mayer’s argument stemmed from a desire to emphasise Nazi anti-communism over antisemitism, no one could accuse Cesarani of anything similar; as a result, the latter’s articulation of a very similar position is found to be more persuasive thanks to its historiographical and argumentative context rather than thanks to its narrative description of the past as such.
The separation of the Holocaust from military history has long been bridged and the dominance of a simplistic ‘intentionalist’ position no longer holds much sway. The marketing of Cesarani’s book as a trade publication with new and controversial theses contributes to the mix too. But one cannot say that Final Solution is ‘truer’ in the sense of being closer to reality; one can only say, if one finds it persuasive, that its interpretation acts as a better substitute for the past than other histories, and this not solely on empirical, discursive or epistemic grounds but also on aesthetic and overall interpretative ones. As Kuukkanen admits, ‘there is no ideally justified thesis because rational warrant depends on so many contingent and circumstantial factors’ (2015a, 242). Which is tantamount to saying that ‘rational warrant’ is itself a colligatory concept which attempts to make cognitive sense of the historiographical operation but can, as such, therefore be contested. When he goes on in the next sentence to say: ‘Nevertheless, the principles of rationality and rational persuasion enable comparative evaluation of theses in most cases’, it seems, at least on the basis of Holocaust historiography, that this is hardly the case. It is true that the ‘rational warrant’ keeps at bay the ‘anything goes in historiography’ school of thought, which claims there is no defence against Holocaust denial; but it helps far less when trying to adjudicate between competing rationally-warranted overall interpretations of the Holocaust, such as those produced by Friedländer, Bloxham, Gerlach or Cesarani. Instead, we are faced with the intractability of narrative competition.
A final, and perhaps less obvious example concerns an aspect of the Holocaust that has only recently begun to receive the attention it warrants by historians: the Holocaust in Romania. This is an important case not only because of the large number of Jews killed but also because of the large number of Jews not killed; these two contrary statements matter because they reveal that the murder of the Jews, Romanian and others who were under Romanian control (i.e. not including those Jews in Northern Transylvania which was ceded to Hungary in 1940 but including the Jews of Transnistria, the area of Ukraine between the Dniester and Bug rivers which was occupied by the Romanian army in June 1941) owed rather little to German orders. Although the Holocaust was first and foremost a German project, without local collaborators the numbers of Jews killed would have been far lower; in the case of Romania (and also to some extent, Croatia, Slovakia, France, Hungary, The Netherlands and Norway), the Holocaust was largely an indigenous project, in which Nazi visions of a Europe ‘cleansed’ of Jews meshed easily with longstanding national visions of creating an ethnically-homogeneous nation state (Stone 2017). Romania was responsible for deporting Jews from the territories acquired after World War I (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina) to Transnistria, where they were dumped in appalling conditions and where several hundred thousand died in ghettos, camps or in massacres, alongside tens of thousands of local Jews, including the Jews of Odessa. But the Romanians, seeing which way the wind was blowing in the war, and having regard for those Jews who they considered more ‘Romanian’ than the ‘Eastern Jews’ of the Greater Romanian territory, reversed their policy with the result that the Jews of the Regat (the ‘Old Kingdom’ of Moldavia and Wallachia, including Bucharest) survived, as did the Jews of Banat.
Historians have debated how these facts should be interpreted: was Marshal Antonescu a war criminal (as he was shot for being in 1946) or a ‘saviour of Jews’? Should what happened to the Jews in Transnistria be understood as a purely Romanian initiative or was the German overall control in Axis Europe the crucial factor? Romanian historian Constantin Iordachi discusses this debate concerning Romanian-German relations during World War II; he notes that ‘nationalist-oriented’ historians have argued that the Germans alone were responsible for what happened to the Jews of Romania. By contrast, other historians have argued that ‘in Romania the Jewish question in general and antisemitism in particular had a specific history, different from that of Germany. They have demonstrated that the Romanian leaders were not simple executors of German war plans but that they operated by virtue of their own political agenda, inspired by but not totally controlled by Germany’ (Iordache 2004, 35-36). 
This sort of statement cannot be ‘found’ in the ‘facts’ though it can be more or less persuasively argued. Certainly the nationalist argument that Antonescu ‘saved’ the Jews can be disproven by bringing forward more facts. But the relative weight to be ascribed to German influence over Romanian actions is a matter of interpretation. Iordachi’s description of the historiography in 2004 looks different today in light of work recently done by Vladimir Solonari (2017), whose understanding of the Holocaust in Romania is informed by a trend in genocide studies which argues that simplistic intentionalist readings need to be corrected by showing how genocide emerged out of longstanding ethno-nationalist policies in states allied to Nazi Germany, by examining interethnic relations at a local level (not just orders emanating from Berlin), by placing genocidal policies in a geopolitical context, and by examining the ways in which victims responded to their persecution with different strategies in different locations.​[14]​ All of these arguments suggest that constructed histories can take many forms and that, even leaving aside texts which do not count as ‘history’ because their use of sources does not conform to disciplinary norms, deciding which is most ‘appropriate’ on the basis of rhetorical, epistemic and discursive grounds simply leaves the question begging as to who sanctions those grounds in the first place.

Realism of sorts
The discussion of just a few examples from Holocaust historiography shows that one the one hand Kuukkanen is right: without a concrete discussion of works produced by historians, theory of history is inadequate as an explanation of how history is written and how competing narrative explanations are adjudicated. On another point, Kuukkanen is on shakier ground: by examining Holocaust historiography we can see that the defence of historical research and writing on the basis of its being a rational enquiry does not fully take the measure of the disagreements that exist amongst historians, especially in a massive field such as Holocaust historiography (I have selected only a few cases from a vast stock). This leads to another point that does to some extent show how historiography, in all its competing manifestations, hangs together: in all of these debates, and in my discussion of them, we can see that even with an awareness of the constructedness of history, history remains dedicated to a kind of realism.
This is the case because, as Pihlainen argues, ‘meaning or authority comes about, in this mind-set of realism, through an agreement that the things described are “real”. Not always necessarily factual, as having actually happened, but certainly as representative of a specific and actual condition of experience or sociohistorical moment’ (2005, 182). Holocaust historians, like their readers, are reluctant to let go of the notion that what they describe is ‘real’, not simply because of fear of Holocaust deniers – who do not need to refer to debates in theory of history to justify their stupidities – but because it feels instinctively wrong to suggest that what is being narrated is not in some sense ‘real’. Pihlainen adds that historians ‘seem to be quite unaware of the problems with their realistic aesthetic commitments’ (2005, 186). That may sometimes be the case but it is just as likely that there is a widespread sense of discomfort in accepting that these interpretations are provisional. One can both understand and sympathise with this discomfort – the Holocaust was an event with serious political, ethical and philosophical ramifications which are still felt today – at the same time as recognising that, logically speaking, it is misplaced and that all works of history are time-bound and only function temporarily as appropriate substitutes for a past that remains forever gone.
Indeed, what the rational constructivist approach does not seem to appreciate is that the inability to adjudicate between competing narratives on grounds other than aesthetic or political is a positive state of affairs. The desire to be finished with history is a mark of totalitarianism and the vast body of Holocaust historiography – as with other topics – indicates that debates over the validity of historical arguments are a sign of freedom and that, as I have argued previously history should stay ‘ceaselessly unfinished’ (Stone 2010: 283).







^1	  The interview was given in German in Berlin on 10 April 1960: ‘Die Geschichte ist eine grausame Göttin, rücksichtslos, und dokumentiert wieder und wieder ihre eiskalte Neutralität, ihre Gleichgültigkeit. Nur wenn man vorwärtsgewandt ist, für die Zukunft sich einsetzt, den jungen Menschen zu einem edlem Geist und Verhalten erzieht, kann man die Vergangenheit exkommunizieren.’ On the Wiener Library’s testimonies project, under the auspices of its then Director, Eva Reichmann, see Schmidt and Barkow 2016.
^2	  Some historians might think that one answer to Ankersmit’s questions might be: ‘genocide’.
^3	  Earlier White wrote: ‘There are no extra-ideological grounds on which to arbitrate among the conflicting conceptions of the historical process and of historical knowledge appealed to by the different ideologies’ (1973, 26).
^4	  As I first argued in Stone 2003.
^5	  I do not suggest that these three thinkers are indistinguishable; that is far from being the case. Nevertheless, they share some basic assumptions – most obviously that history is constructed – and each of them contributes in a useful way to what seems to me currently the most productive way of understanding how and why we write history.
^6	  On presence, see especially Ankersmit 2005, a book which marked a radical break with Ankersmit’s earlier pioneering work on narrativism, and Runia 2006; for a critique, Pihlainen 2014a.
^7	  I will not engage here with the specific problems engendered by Kuukkanen’s distinction between what he calls ‘representationalism’ and ‘non-representationalism’. See also Kuukkanen 2013, and Paul A. Roth’s review of Kuukkanen’s book (Roth 2016).
^8	  This recalls Hayden White’s argument in his foreword to Jacques Rancière’s The Names of History that the study and writing of history ‘must be considered, first and foremost, less as a scientific discipline than as a “discourse” in which history’s possible objects of study are identified, various methods or procedures for studying them are debated, and a proper manner of speaking about such objects is contrived’ (White 1994, viii. See also Helo 2016).
^9	  Or, as Keith Jenkins (2009) puts it, there is no entailment from fact to value.
^10	  As I show for Romania in Stone 2018.
^11	  For discussion, see Eaglestone 2004, ch7. For recent work on the Order Police which challenges both explanations, see Rich, forthcoming.
^12	  See also Bergen 2015, 299-320.
^13	  Gerlach 2016, ch.7, which argues that antisemitism is insufficient as an explanation for the Holocaust’s occurrence but certainly does not seek to minimise the significance of the phenomenon, especially at a popular level.
^14	  Other examples of this sort of approach include: Bloxham 2009; Solonari 2010; Korb, 2013; Segal 2016; Gerlach 2016.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